Arab Status Report - Issue № 2

السبت 19 يناير, 2019

Arab Status Report

 

This periodic report monitors the development of the situation in the Arab region, with a geopolitical reading and from the perspective of the "common Arab interest system" in the context of the competition of regional and international interests. In its work, the Arab Peace Initiative (Beirut Summit 2002) and the Riyadh Declaration issued by the 2007 Arab Summit are a fundamental reference in the assessment of the issues...  With a particular reference to the Lebanese situation, from the perspective of Living-together (coexistence), the Taëf Agreement and the resolutions of international legitimacy especially the Resolution 1701.

 

Indicators of the "new phase" of the conflict in the region in light of the decision to withdraw from Syria.

Is it a confused decision or a confusing one?

1. Putin stopped by the words "the new phase" in the words of Trump, when the latter announced his decision to withdraw his military forces from Syria, wondering (Putin) loudly - not only in his own mind - what the US president meant by this "vague" phrase!

This question "above the surface" certainly reflects a bit of discontent in the diplomatic language. It is a dissatisfaction not with the decision, but from its goals and from a hidden pole, about the new stage that Trump has not consulted with his presumed Russian "partner". From here came the confusion of Russia in the following order: In a first and immediate comment, Putin welcomed the decision as "a step in the right direction and would facilitate a political solution in Syria," a solution that is supposed to have been placed in the custody of the Russian player. The immediate welcome came in line with Putin's recent repeated statements that "the illegal American presence in Syria is hampering the settlement efforts." After a bit of reflection, he wondered aloud what the new stage was, but added: "This withdrawal would add many complications to the reality of the conflict in Syria and the region." And sometimes went to question the seriousness of the withdrawal, when himself retreated on a similar Russian decision a few months ago! A subsequent statement by a Pentagon spokesman did not dispel Putin's perplexity. He added: "In the next phase, we will deal with all parties with more scrutiny and accountability" (28/12/2018).

2. It may well not jump over this "legitimate" suit, which the Russian and Iranian have always been proud of, drawing on formal understandings and agreements with the Syrian regime, in exchange for the "illegality" of the American and Turkish presence,! And the reason for our accentuation on the issue is not the obvious fact that "when you don't have a thing you can't give it", but the obvious previewed and known reality… The "legitimacy" of the Russian and Iranian roles in Syria is in reality and practically derived from an "American Permission". This began during the era of President Barack Obama, when he "swallowed" his famous decision to punish the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons against his people, and then proceeded to implement the nuclear agreement with Iran, taking interest in the rates of "nuclear enrichment" and ignoring "enrichment of Iranian influence" in the Arab region !. This was not for the love of this team and the hate of the other, but on basis of an American desire so the region would be after 2011 an arena to exhaust all parties, through two main mechanisms: an Arab-Iranian war with doctrinal content (The precedent of Iraq after 2003 exercise "successful" in this trend), and the second mechanism is the "coalition of minorities" religious and ethnic against the Sunni Arab majority in the region. And if Iran's role was vital and essential in the first mechanism, based on an expansionist ambition fueled by a crazy nationalist memory and doctrinal "adaptations", the main role of the second mechanism was given to the Russian, by virtue of his open appetite for restoring a historic role. These maneuvers allowed the Iranian to boldly denounce assert control over four Arab capitals and allowing the Russians to protect the Syrian regime, and to advance Iran in this regard. This creature, called "Daesh" had - since the release of his first pioneers from the prisons of "Sidnaya" and "Abu Ghraib" - a significant role in the operation of the two mechanisms mentioned, and so it was available to anyone who wanted to hit a rival here and there - and all our opponents - to hit that creature under the pretext of fighting terrorism! .. Thus we had dozens of definitions of terrorism, according to the mood of the speaker and his situational interest!
3. Stopping at the question of "legality" referred to, whether derived from the Syrian regime or the American permission, was not just a comment on Putin's statements, for the purpose of logical argument, but we wanted to re-refer to what we considered in our previous report (November 15, 2018) a key Or an introduction to the American role and other roles in the ongoing Syrian crisis. And on the basis of the "cloud of Harun al-Rashid”, meaning that the American is a role distributor and master of its functions, not in search of a role. And in this game any party can move and "innovate" within the margin given to him, and he can claim "divine victories" that satisfy his ego and fans, but he does not change anything fundamentally in the rules of the game determined by the "actual, comprehensive and stubborn" balance of power in the world and the region so far. Moreover, our reading of the pre-withdrawal phase of the United States remains and more likely the same in our reading of the so-called new phase, because it is not really new in terms of objectives, and if some of the positions, slogans and traffic signals has changed... And which will emerge from the present report and its estimates. However, we are not advocates of the Paxa Americana, nor of the anti-Americanists of nature, ideology and fashion in our country for half a century, but of those who call for the promotion of the "common Arab interest system" in accordance with the principles of justice, equity, and peace. As defined in the 2007 "Riyadh Declaration".

Back to context

4. Returning to the context of the Russian "confusion", we see that Putin's departure from the parameters of the American decision is not misplaced. The man knows exactly what the US administration said about the Russian role in Syria when it sat alone up with some of its Arab friends (the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan) during the Manama dialogue early last November. During that meeting the US Secretary of Defense spoke at length about a Russian-American conflict in Syria, stressing "the opportunism of Russia and ignoring the criminal activities of Bashar Assad's regime against his people, which prove - as he declared - its lack of genuine commitment to ethical principles. And that its presence in the region cannot replace the long permanent and transparent commitment of the United States to the Middle East "(Al Watan Saudi Arabia, November 4, 2018). And we may see here that Matisse's resignation, in opposition to the decision to withdraw, does not necessarily indicate the retreat of the US President to Russia, insofar as it may indicate a tactical dispute between the president and his defense minister in this regard, or as Mattisse pointed out in the letter of resignation to the lack of chemistry between the two men: "You have the right to have a defense minister whose vision is better aligned with your vision" (Agencies 21/12/2018). However, while Putin preached the illegality of the US presence in Syria, he was hearing "American threats to derail the Sochi-Astana track, because this path has proved futile and unsuccessful, with the testimony of UN envoy De Mistura, who has just resigned from his mission, under the title of failure and dead-end" (Arabic.Net, 30/11/2018).
5. Confusion was not confined to the Russian alone, but it included all those concerned with the decision, the closest and most distant, and most notably the Turkish. Erdogan, who was preparing to invade the Kurdish region in northern Syria, slowed down to carry out his threats, announcing that his steps would be coordinated with the American side. He was also enthusiastic to declare that Turkey would replace the United States in leading the war on terror in Syria! It was said that this enthusiasm came down on him from a telephone conversation with the American president, in which the latter said: "Syria is for you, O Pasha!". But whatever the truth of that conversation, the ambiguity surrounding the withdrawal and beyond is giving the illusion for many regional players the possibility of receiving the flag from the US. And this is an additional door to the unfriendly rivalry between all the aspirants, mainly Russian and Turkish. However, the Turkish ambition has received a quick shock on the issue of the Kurds. The US Secretary of State was quick to launch a dramatic warning about the possibility of a "Turkish massacre against the Kurds", vowing to protect them in all cases. This came with various US procedures and references that have been made, most notably three: Extend the withdrawal period from thirty days to four months, open to other extensions, without any specific calendar; US statements that the United States' commitment to protecting the Kurds does not depend on direct military presence (about 2,000 US troops), but that there is enough American presence in the Arab and Mediterranean region to protect them; Launching information leaks (Which may reflect direct or indirect notifications) that the entry of "Manbaj" is prohibited for the various parties, which may repeat the experience of "Idleb" in some way.
6. In the same context, at the end of the first week of January, US contacts with the Turkish side resulted in two statements of very important significance: the first issued by US national security adviser John Bolton, revealing the "Erdogan's pledge to protect Kurdish fighters," and confirming the statement of Foreign Minister Mike Pompeo, and Erdogan's second, saying "the US withdrawal should be coordinated with the right partners." The phrase "the right partners" is a sign of the unsympathetic competition between the "war on terror" partners in Syria, whether it is to fill the void caused by the expected withdrawal, always with the US coordination, or because of the divergence of partners' agendas. Erdogan's pledge "to protect the Kurdish fighters (according to Bolton's declaration from Israel, and on the basis of the distinction between the Kurdish People Protection Units and the PKK) strengthens the possibility that the US-Turkish conversation has somehow addressed Turkey's response to the expansion attempts of Iran and its militias with the Syrian regime towards the Kurdish region. But Erdogan's reluctance to deny the story of the "pledge" and his refusal to welcome Bolton because of his statements indicate that there was an impasse in the process of understanding between the two sides, which the Turkish preferred not to disclose in such a crude American way. This misunderstanding was accompanied by statements attributed to "Turkish sources," accusing the US administration of working to "divide the Syrian territory into conflicting areas of influence, as the Sykes-Picot Agreement did a hundred years ago" (Alarabiya, 8/1/2019).                                                Of course, we do not think the possibility of Erdogan abandoning his rejection of any independent Kurdish entity in northern Syria, nor do we think that the US demands it. (The American had previously refrained from supporting the disengagement project in the Kurdistan region a few months ago, despite the results of the Kurdish referendum Came in favor of secession). Moreover, most observers believe that the strongest trend among the Kurds of Syria is a non-secessionist trend. It seems, from the US point of view, that the Kurds of Syria should not be a piece of paper in the hands of the Iranian and/or the Syrian regime, especially after their "appeal" for the Syrian regime, as for "the worst evil"! These exchanges of fire between the US and Turkey on the political level did not stop talks between the two sides at the military level. But it seems that these talks have seen a resurgence, Which led Trump on January 13 to the launch a "Roar" on Twitter, in a "tweet": "The United States will destroy Turkey economically if the Kurds were hit!" The next day Erdogan responded to the tweet by declaring: Turkey will establish a security zone in northern Syria, as Trump suggested.

7. On this picture, it seems that the US politics is moving towards making the parties ready to enter the area of the Kurds, from Turkish to Russian to the Syrian regime to the Iranian militias, to face each other, sooner or later. Thus, the US "awaiting," coupled with maneuvers of political power, has touched the purposes of the resolution and its implications rather than, as some have explained, a retreat under internal pressures that have been opposed to it from the outset. In this way, the Israeli assessment of the Kurds may be closer to reality: "The American withdrawal from Syria will not affect the Kurds," it said. "What is going on in Kurdish areas is nothing more than media propaganda," according to the Hebrew website "Dibka", close to Israeli Intelligence (22/12/2018). Any way, the US Secretary of State's tour of the region starting on January 8, 2019 (which began in Jordan and Egypt, including a quick visit to Iraq and will include the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries) under the title "Clarifying US policy in the region after the decision to withdraw," revealed the basic features of this policy:
   1. Emphasizing the continued presence of the US in the Middle East, with all political, military and economic meanings, which is considered a "message of reassurance to the allies of the stability of Washington's strategy in the region", especially the statement of Pompeo from the plane that took him to Amman: "I want to emphasize that The United States remains concerned with all the tasks it has been involved in for the last two years "(AFP, 9/1/2019).
   2. The US administration is committed to continuing the war against terrorism, with its two overlapping facets: Sunni fundamentalist terrorism ("Daesh" and "al-Qaeda" - and in Egypt, the Egyptian Foreign Minister added the Muslim Brotherhood, while Pompeo was at his side during the joint press conference), and the terror of Shiite fundamentalists (represented by Iran and its militaristic arms In the region). It is perhaps the first time that US policy approaches this clear link between the two violence; contrary to the "Sunni terrorism" theory after September 11, 2001, that theory that has been used by Iran to the fullest extent over the years.
   3. Indirect criticism of Obama's policy in the region, which led to the practical and ultimately "to strengthen the control of the Syrian regime on the ground thanks to Russia and Iran." This is linked to a previous statement made by Pompeo last October to the Jewish National Security Institute that the United States "will not finance reconstruction in Syria as long as Iranian or Iranian-backed forces have not left this country forever." It is known that reconstruction is also linked to the return of displaced Syrians and the success of the process of political transition according to the principles of "Geneva One" .. Two processes that Russia bent to accomplish, but did not stop complaining about the US administration's reluctance to help her. Not only that, but Trump himself recently said that the reconstruction in Syria will be the Saudi Arabia concern!
8. The above-mentioned basic features clearly indicate that the title of "withdrawal" was not accurate - even if this title attempted to engage in previous Trump electoral pledges - and that what happened and happens on the ground is merely a minor modification of military positioning, accompanied with more "Offensive" American strategic direction. This change is immediately apparent in comparison to the large US military presence in the region and its stability, even with some success in reducing the number of soldiers on the battlefield here and there (Iraq, Afghanistan and finally Syria). The strategic offensive is more evident in the MESA project, which was first proposed by the US president in May 2017, the United States then revealed that the parties to which it would join were the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as well as Egypt and Jordan. Which was supposed to be officially announced in October 2018, but was postponed to the beginning of the new year... And here is the Secretary of State's tour, time and program visits and contents expressed by Pompeo during this tour, constitute a "declaration" of this project, which - according to some observers - which is still lacking in many procedural issues, as well as some obstacles, notably the problems of Qatar with the Gulf Quartet, particularly those related to its alliance with Turkey on the basis of support for jihadist political Islam organizations in the region " (First Strategic Report 2018-2019, published by the Center of the Future for Research and Advanced Studies - United Arab Emirates). In our assessment, political Islam, both Sunni and Shiite jihadists, cannot be reconciled with the strategic orientations of the MESA Arab countries, especially with Pompeo declaring that the main objective of this new alliance is to stand up the dangers of terrorists, both and together... It is not yet clear how the US administration will solve this problem while continuing to insist on the existence of Qatar within the coalition (the last American statements in this regard is Pompeo's words that the unity of the Gulf position is a prerequisite for the success of the project). We believe MESA is the most important indicator for the next phase.
9. In order to supplement the awkwardness of the positions, the French confusion may be the most obvious. In a first reaction, the French defense minister said that her country would abide by the decision to withdraw, despite its objections to Trump's claim to "elimination of Daesh." But the defense minister quickly said otherwise, asserting that France will continue to fight "Daesh" despite the US decision. Then the same minister, and also quickly, reiterated that her country "is determined to end the mission against "Daesh" in Syria before the completion of the declared US withdrawal" (Agencies 1/1/2019). The observers do not expect any practical translation of the latest Franco-Russian contacts "in order to continue the war against "Daesh" and without the leadership of the United States."                                                                                                                                                                               The British and German positions may have been less confused, although they were more decisive in denying the story of the elimination of "Daesh". We estimate that the lack of confusion on both sides is due to their economy in the sentiments and statements, contrary to what some have called "French haste and improvisation" under President Macron. We should not forget that the French president's call for "the derivation of a European defense policy apart from America and even facing it" is still the subject of an open misunderstanding with the US administration.                                                              There are two sides that did not show confusion or surprise in their stated positions and may have shown the opposite: the Israeli and the Iranian. As for the Israeli, he is very reassured about his long-standing and ever-renewed understandings with the American side, regardless of the existing administration. So his position on the decision to withdraw came on one image with no changes: "With withdrawal or without withdrawal, Israel knows how to defend itself and its interests, and will continue to intervene in Syria whenever and when needed, and in the way it deems appropriate".  It is noteworthy that this intervention has not stopped recently, through the Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria - to say - or by opening the file "tunnels Hezbollah" on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Observers agree that Israel does not rely solely on permanent coordination with the US side, but also "puts in its pocket" other key commitments by other parties, especially Russia and Turkey.                                                                                                                                        As far as Iran is concerned, it can operate only the use of its usual ideological apparatus: "The decision to withdraw signals the confusion of the American administration ... it is also a shining demonstration of America's defeat in the region!" Such position addresses only the Iranian propaganda audience at home first and abroad in depth. In fact, it is a forced escape forward. The Iranian regime is fully aware of the meaning of "the opening up its influence file in the region", as all the American statements confirmed during the Trump era, especially the explanations given by Pompey in his recent tour, considering that his withdrawal from the region and "his return to be a regime at the head of a normal state" - according to the American demand declared and identical to the official Arab demand - are likely to lead to its fall inside!.. And the last two statements of the Supreme Leader of the Republic Khamenei "The sanctions have become a severe pressure on Iranian society" and President Ruhani ("the Soviet Union's military arsenal did not protect him from falling") is a strong indicator of Iran's rapprochement between two options: The option of the Revolutionary Guard to continue the "test of power", based on the operation of its main positions in the Arab region (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen), in opposite to the option of "liberal realism" to save the regime at home with deliberate retreats in the region.. This latter option is represented by Ruhani (in his many intersections with the legacy of the Iranian opposition extending from Khatami to Rafsanjani) and objectively supported by Khamenei's statement referred to.

Indicators of Iranian reluctance

10. In addition to the reluctance of the Revolutionary Guards (most notably the use of ballistic missiles, the sending of satellites to space, and the declaration of its intention to resume nuclear enrichment beyond the agreed levels), his main positions of influence in the Arab region remain the pillar of his opposition. As follows:

In Lebanon

The "state detention" in Lebanon is the main and inclusive title of what Iran is doing in this country - through Hezbollah - from "confrontation with the United States and Israel" - according to the raised slogan - and by extension with the Arab world. This is represented by working in four lines:

• Controlling the peace and war decision between Lebanon and Israel (July 2006 war as a model) and then the fight of Hezbollah in Syria in favor of the Iranian agenda since 2013.
• Preserving the position of the Presidency of the Republic for two and a half years empty, which ended only with the arrival of the Hezbollah candidate (General Michel Aoun) to the presidency in 2016.
• To prevent the formation of the government for eight months now, to impose the ministerial equation that Hezbollah wants.
• The permanent quest to abolish the Taef Agreement of 1989, based on the Islamic-Christian monotheism in the government form, and replace it with a New Foundational Conference based on the tripled equation (Shiite-Sunni-Christian sects), which would "strike the Lebanese lifestyle (living together)" according to the Maronite Patriarch, last week. Iran has been directly involved in this endeavor since 2007 (on the sidelines of the Lebanese Dialogue Conference in Saint-Cloud, France).

At the moment, the Lebanese political scene is overshadowed by the image of the government's obstruction imposed by Hezbollah eight months ago, in conjunction with the new US sanctions on Iran. He has made internal excuses to this end because of his stipulations on the process of authorship. Otherwise, "no government!" As he put it, and what he told all concerned. Of these requirements: the number of ministers and the distribution of portfolios, and then the insistence on the representation of his allies of the Sunni deputies, and up to his refusal to get the President of the Republic and his political stream on the 11 ministers in the Thirteenth government... The quorum of disruption or what is known as the Blocking third… However, in the eyes of objective observers, these controversial headlines do not constitute the real reason for the delay, insofar as they represent an excuse for Iran's decision to continue to rely on the Lebanese situation in the face of the US attack on it since the announcement of the withdrawal from Syria. This regional factor was finally endorsed by the President of the Republic, for the first time, saying: "The political instability in Lebanon is due to the aspirations of the internal parties and the conflict in the region" (14/1/2019). In addition to the resistance of the prime minister-designate (regarding the representation of the Hezbollah Sunnies) and the non-response of the president to the requirements of Hezbollah (regarding the blocking third), the visit of US Under Secretary of State David Hill (15/01/2019) to give a strong impetus to those who want to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon. And by stressing that the US administration is committed to supporting the security institutions that are exclusively authorized to defend Lebanon, and considering that Hezbollah, as a militia and besides being rated as terrorist in the eyes of the American administration, is a major obstacle to the establishment of the state and encourages the caretaker government to confront economic challenges…

In our assessment, the bold words of the Maronite Patriarch during his meeting with the Maronite leadership in Bkerke (16/1-2019) and his stern warning of "projects to cancel the Taef Agreement and secret and public invitations to a New Foundational Conference that would replace the "tripled - system" instead of the "Equal sharing" in the form of the state, in addition to the ongoing work to enshrine new norms contrary to the Constitution ... "- We say that this warning is one of the most prominent indicators emerging in Lebanon and indicating the challenge to the de-facto authority represented by Iranian influence. We say this to our knowledge and the knowledge of everyone that the Maronite Patriarch himself went in some times earlier to demand a new social contract, under pressure from the thesis of the "coalition of minorities." In other words, if the wave of the "minority alliance" that Iran had previously set up, which led to the claim of the Christians of the Ease for an international protection, the new wave launched by the US administration against Iranian influence in the region would feed an opposite dynamic of the past at the Christian level. This is a favorable opportunity for advocates of "the return of the state under the conditions of Taef and the existing constitution, and the fulfilling of Lebanon for its commitment to the resolutions of international legitimacy in support of its sovereignty and independence" in order to form a national, Islam-Christian team instead of remaining divided and sectarian. Do not miss here the reference to the attempts made by the Syrian-Iranian alliance in Lebanon to cancel or postpone the Arab Economic Summit, on the eve of its meeting in Beirut on 20/1/2019, sometimes by objecting to not inviting Syria, or to object to Libya's invitation! An additional indication of "the failure of attempts to isolate Lebanon from its Arab environment," according to some Arab invited diplomats.

The bottom line in the current Lebanese situation is that this situation remains in the circle of attraction because Iran will not easily relinquish this privileged position of influence in the region. However, the equation of attraction is open to the possibility of altering the balance of power in Lebanon to the detriment of Iran, after the return of American interest in this country after " the neglect". It must be emphasized that the traps of violence and chaos must be avoided in the context of "restoration of sovereignty".

In Iraq

The Iraqi and Lebanese situations are similar in some respects and distinguish themselves from other faces. Our talk here is still about the "indicators of Iranian resistance."

In terms of symmetry, we have seen in the last two months how Iran tried to impose its conditions on the formation of the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi, by insisting on holding the defense and interior portfolios and in keeping with its insistence on the continuous and independent role of the "Popular Crowd"- (hashed shaaby) militia, under the guidance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. This "independent and continuing" role of the "Popular Crowd" - (hashed shaaby) in Iraq is an attempt to match Hezbollah's role in Lebanon, always on the pretext of weakening the regular national army here and there. It is known to observers that the Iranian thesis has long promoted the idea of relying on popular crowds - (hashed shaaby) in the countries of Arab unrest, instead of regular armies... This idea inspired by the reality of bilateral defense in Iran, between the army and the Revolutionary Guards, with the advance of the last one. In terms of symmetry to, we have noted Iran's adherence to its conditions vis-à-vis the two governments, in conjunction with the US declarations (the Pompeo tour) regarding the open confrontation with Iran in the Arab region. It is the object of striking symmetry the two prime ministers, Abdul Mahdi and Hariri, feel that they are in the midst of two heavy pressures: the pressure exerted by Iranian influence on their countries and the pressure of US policy at the regional level at the current stage, Which made them express, each in his own way, a demand that can be formulated in these terms: "for God's sake... whether on sanctions or dealing with the de-facto forces regarding our defense-security plan!"

As for the difference between the two cases, The most prominent achievement of that direct American presence in Iraq since 2003, and even if this presence was accompanied by a kind of American-Iranian cohabitation there for more than ten years, it was at the same time a controlling  factor for the tyranny of the Iranian influence, which finally contributed to attenuation of the Shiite public alignment behind the policy of the pro-Iranian Daawa Party, especially in conjunction with the exposure of this policy in two major realities: the humiliating fall of the Iraqi army in front of "Daesh" in Mosul, and the financial corruption with astronomical figures, most of it went to finance the "Iranian Jihad" In the region. In addition to that American factor - and perhaps equivalent to the social criterion - the differentiation of Shiite religious reference in Najaf from the direction of the Daawa Party, and away from Iran, which made in time a major leverage of popular protest movements against Iran in Iraq, and the failure of some Shiite political forces from the coalition Led by the Daawa Party .. This was reflected in the equations of the formation of the government of Abdul-Mahdi, as well as his own mandate. In comparison to the Shiite situation in Lebanon, it remains strongly held by Iran, because the Lebanese state, which was distressed after the Taef, and even after the uprising of sovereignty and independence in 2005, failed to represent a secure safe haven for all Shiites, who were left to Hezbollah to dominate, including the Shiite" Amal movement", although the Lebanese Shi'a were historically closer to Najaf, ideologically and Arabian, from there to Qom.

Our assessment, as we have said in the Lebanese case, is that Iran will not easily relinquish its privileged position in Iraq and will continue to resist with all its tools, although this reluctance is open to further weakness in this country since the US-Iranian "desire marriage" there is over. It is known that the marriage of desire is defined by the “Definition of Fiqh " a contract interrupted by specifying the term."

In Yemen

The Stockholm agreement, sponsored by the United Nations, came after the intensive military attack launched by the Saudi-UAE alliance in mid-November against Huthi sites in Hodeidah. The point of view of the Arab coalition declared was that the Houthis will not come to the negotiating table with their known reference (the initiative of the Gulf + outputs of the Yemeni national dialogue + international resolution 2216) but only forced. ُEver-less the attack was fraught with political and humanitarian embarrassments, given the media and diplomatic focus of Western media on the catastrophic scale of the destruction caused by coalition raids, especially at the level of civilian installations and individuals, as well as the heading of "famine" that was published by many reports of humanitarian associations and international statements.

 The Alliance considered that the signing of the Stockholm Agreement on its basic terms was in line with its expectations. These terms are: "Stop the clashes under the supervision of international observers - international supervision of the port of Hodeidah and other nearby ports - the delivery of a security in the region to local forces of government legitimacy - the exchange of prisoners between the parties - to continue negotiations after the implementation of the above-mentioned items.

The Huthis did not abide by any of these terms until mid-January. They followed the policy of circumventing decisions, starting with robbing humanitarian aid and obstructing its arrival, passing by circumventing the formation of local forces, and ending with the refusal to exchange prisoners and assault on the convoy of the commander of the of international observers, in addition to continuing the firing of ballistic missiles and guided aircraft, made by Iran .. The only and late progress represents the agreement to initiate exchange procedures, after Jordanian mediation, according to the UN envoy Griffiths.

 According to many Saudi and Emirati statements in recent times, most of the problem lies in the international way of dealing with the Yemeni crisis. This deal is based on unfair equality between an outlawed militias, and condemned one by an international resolution requires to demilitarize it and evacuate all the sites it occupied since the beginning of the coup, and between the Arab alliance that includes the largest Gulf countries as well as Yemeni legitimacy represented by the government of the President-elect. The paradox is that the international envoys to Yemen (three so far respectively) and those charged with implementing an international resolution under Chapter VII (2216) acted as couriers between the two parties and seeking a reference to the solution, which is, in fact, present and known.

On the above observers see no immediate solution to the Yemeni crisis, The Huthi equivocation will remain, and the Iranian will continue its reluctance in Yemen, A as we have seen in Iraq and Lebanon, even if he's forced to "Finance the Houthi war with the oil barrel, instead of the hard currency that is not available to him,"  according to a recent international report recently issued (Alarabia, 18/1/2019). It must be said that the continuation of the Iranian opposition in Yemen means unambiguously to continue to drain the Arab alliance led by Saudi Arabia, especially if the fluidity of "international politics" continues there!

In Syria

The battle of reluctance in Syria represents the mother of battles for Iran at this stage. That is for two reasons- First, the main and declared aim of American policy has been more clearly and decisively defined than ever before: to get Iran out of Syria. We do not need to restore US statements on this subject in recent times. The second reason, which is no less obvious and significant, is that leading Iran out from Syria leads to the emergence of its influence from the entire Arab region, in the manner of the collapse of the dominoes. Since the late 1980s, Iran's strategy of interfering in the affairs of the Arab region, on the lever "resistances", has been built on the "cornerstone" of understanding with the Syrian Baath regime and taking Syria and Lebanon as a starting point for achieving that strategy. In addition, the battle of Syria is now the battle of all forces concerned in the Middle East, as evident by the simplest geopolitical observation. Therefore, what we have seen in this report so far, from Iranian impediments in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, seems to be linked to the mother of the battles in Syria, without neglecting its local characteristics.

How will the US administration get Iran out of Syria?

The Secretary of State answered this question succinctly, but keyly: "with diplomacy."

In our assessment, based on our geopolitical reading of what is going on, diplomacy here means reengineering roles, missions, convergences, and withdrawals in Syria, leading to the exclusion

of the Syrian regime from Iran. Thus, the Syrian would be offered  the following formula: "If you want to preserve your head - that is the end of your goals - you have to move away from Iran, and in this case we will provide you with Arab acceptance, as for Israel, you know very well how much they take care of you".

The same equation addresses the Arab side with the following logic: "The embrace of Bashar al-Assad in the Arab world helps to keep him away from Iran, and at the same time provides the possibility of an Arab role to return to Syria, after this role has fallen to the point of absence since the intervention of Russia and Turkey.

Of course, all the American offers on the various sides fall under the heading of "diplomacy", as this word means here of "re-engineering the roles, missions, convergences, and withdrawals in Syria." However, this diplomacy does not disengage from the policy of the strength's show in the region ... The "Arab Status Report" will follow the developments in the light of this assessment in the next two months.