5 Questions About the Cease-Fire Between Israel and Hezbollah

Limited strikes could continue even after the truce.

By Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. FP.

Israel and Hezbollah appear to be on the verge of a cease-fire, which would end a war that has lasted more than 13 months. The Israeli cabinet met today to discuss final details, and Hezbollah notified its Iranian patron that a cease-fire may be imminent.

To date, the war has killed almost 4,000 Hezbollah fighters and Lebanese civilians and more than 100 Israeli civilians and soldiers. Around 60,000 Israelis and 1.2 million Lebanese have been displaced.

The truce is built on the idea that the Lebanese Armed Forces would deploy in southern Lebanon—acting as a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah. But much about the wider situation remains uncertain.

1. How Much Damage Has Israel Done to Hezbollah?
Hezbollah joined the fighting the day after Hamas’s brutal Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, which killed almost 1,200 Israelis and led to a devastating Israeli war in Gaza.

One of the most formidable militant groups in the world, Hezbollah was estimated to have roughly 150,000 rockets and missiles, around 30,000 full-time fighters, and 20,000 reserves at the start of the war, along with a network of fortified positions throughout Lebanon as well as a skilled and respected leadership apparatus. Some of Hezbollah’s systems were precision guided, enabling the group to better target Israel’s military bases, airports, and other critical infrastructure as well as use its huge numbers of unguided systems to launch massive salvos against the Israeli population.

In addition, Hezbollah fighters were well-trained by Iran and were highly experienced after years of fighting to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power in Syria.

But over the past year, Israel has conducted a series of devastating attacks on Hezbollah, greatly diminishing the group’s strength. In a brilliant intelligence operation in September, Israel sabotaged thousands of Hezbollah-owned pagers, walkie talkies, and some laptops, killing or wounding many Hezbollah fighters. Israel also began to systematically kill senior Hezbollah leaders, including its charismatic and skilled longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, as well as numerous senior lieutenants.

Israeli airstrikes have killed hundreds of rank-and-file Hezbollah fighters as well. U.S. and Israeli officials claim that Israel has destroyed half of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, and Israeli ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border have destroyed tunnels and Hezbollah positions there.

Although Hezbollah is still able to fire large salvos at Israel, the conflict has been one-sided, with Israel’s losses dwarfed by those of Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed group is far weaker than it was a year ago, with its leadership in disarray and its prestige tarnished.

2. Can Hezbollah Rearm?
Hezbollah will try to rebuild its weapons arsenal and increase the quality of its systems. After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Iran poured money and military aid into the Lebanese group. Iran still values Hezbollah as a front-line ally against Israel, and its value is even greater because Hamas, Tehran’s other front-line ally, is even more devastated.

Iran may try to give Hezbollah more precision-guided systems and other weapons that are more effective against Israel. Hezbollah, for its part, will seek to rebuild because it fears renewed conflict with Israel and also because it seeks to be the strongest military power in Lebanon, where it acts as a state within a state.

Russia is a wild card in all of this. Hezbollah and Russia worked together in Syria, and Russia has moved closer to Iran since the former began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Israel has discovered large amounts of Russian weaponry in Hezbollah’s hands, although much of that probably came from Syria, which Moscow has long supported.

As part of its anti-U.S. foreign policy, Russia may decide to increase aid to Iran, knowing that some of what it provides will make its way to Lebanon.

3. How Will Iran Respond to the Losses of Its Proxy?
The Israeli blows against Hezbollah also harm Iran. Although Tehran supports militant groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other extremists in the Middle East, Hezbollah has long been Iran’s most important proxy group.

And Iran itself has fought with Israel in recent months, and again the conflict was one-sided, with large Iranian missile and drone salvos being largely destroyed by Israeli air defenses, while Israel’s precise responses against Iranian air defense sites and other military targets highlighted its much greater capabilities.

In addition to doubling down on Hezbollah, Iran is likely to bolster support for the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis are the one bright spot for Tehran in the conflict with Israel. Iran provided them with training and weapons before the latest conflict, and their post-Oct. 7 attacks on Red Sea shipping in solidarity with Hamas have been a blow to Israel, Egypt, the United States, and other Iranian enemies.

The big uncertainty is whether Iran’s losses in this conflict and the hostile rhetoric of the incoming Trump administration will push Tehran toward developing a nuclear weapon. Tehran is close to doing so already. U.S. intelligence reported in July that “Iran continues to increase the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at multiple facilities, if it chooses to do so.”

Iran probably has not made a decision either way, but the loss of its proxy and the failure of its missile deterrents increase its incentives to develop the ultimate deterrent—and the risk that Israel and the United States will go to war to prevent this nightmare from becoming real.

4. Will Israelis and Lebanese Return to Their Homes?
Israel expanded the war against Hezbollah in the name of returning displaced Israelis to their homes, which requires an end to cross-border attacks by Hezbollah. Lebanese civilians, for their part, also need stability along the Israel-Lebanon border if they are to return to their country’s south.

Civilians on both sides will initially be cautious about returning home. The intelligence and military failures of Oct. 7 diminished the credibility of Israel’s vaunted intelligence services and military forces. Operations against Hezbollah have helped restore the group’s credibility, but Israelis are likely to remain skeptical of government assurances that, this time, the problem is under control. It will take months without attacks for their fears to be allayed.

Lebanese civilians displaced from the south and from Hezbollah-controlled areas in Beirut and other parts of the country also fear renewed war. They are likely to worry that Israel would see any sign that Hezbollah is returning to the south or rebuilding its forces as a reason to resume bombing. They, too, may hesitate to return, although many lack a safety net on which to rely while they wait to see if the cease-fire will hold.

5. Will the War Recur?
There is genuine hope that any cease-fire deal will last, although many question marks remain. In 2006, many Israelis thought their military performance was poor and that Hezbollah would be eager for another round. That proved too pessimistic—both sides largely held their fire after 2006 until the Oct. 7 attacks, providing almost 20 years of peace.

This time around, Hezbollah has been hit far harder. It will need to rebuild its forces and its arsenal to stand a chance against Israel. In addition, its devastating counterintelligence failures will leave the group cautious, as it must always worry that Israel has penetrated its communications or is otherwise watching and able to strike.

Much depends on who will enforce the peace and how well they enforce it. Current reports suggest that the Lebanese Armed Forces would be deployed to southern Lebanon as a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah. But the Lebanese military is weaker than Hezbollah, however, and Israel is not likely to entrust its security to Lebanon, given its poor track record.

Because of this skepticism and because of Hezbollah’s likely attempts to rebuild, Israel may strike at Hezbollah weapons systems and caches that it deems a threat—despite the cease-fire. It may also attack Iranian military figures who support Hezbollah and Hezbollah leaders.

After Oct. 7, Israel is far less trusting of deterrence and more of a believer in keeping its enemies weak. It may view limited strikes as a way of sending a message, and this may work—but such strikes always come with a risk of escalation and renewed war.