Explained: Nasrallah or Iran – Who Really Rules Hezbollah?

The recent preparations of Lebanon's 'Party of God' for a major aerial assault were mostly foiled by Israel. But who actually directs Hezbollah's military strategy, its leader Hassan Nasrallah or its patron Iran? What impact does Israel's policy of assassinating its leaders have on a militia armed with 150,000 missiles?

Allison Kaplan Sommer

For nearly a month, Hezbollah threatened to retaliate for Israel's targeted attack that killed its top commander, Fuad Shukr, in Beirut on July 30.

Almost a month later, the powerful Lebanese Shi'ite militia finally decided to act. Following an escalation of rocket attacks on northern Israel, Hezbollah was preparing to fire additional thousands of rockets and drones at Military Intelligence and Mossad bases in northern and central Israel on the morning of August 25. Those preparations were detected by the Israeli military, which launched a preemptive strike.

Over 100 Israeli fighter jets attacked thousands of rocket launchers in Lebanon, and the Israel Defense Forces managed to intercept most of the rockets that Hezbollah launched towards Israel. These events followed 10 months of exchanges of fire on the Lebanese border initiated by Hezbollah on the day after Hamas' assault on October 7.

On the evening of August 25, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah took to the airwaves to explain the delay in the group's attack as a deliberate "punishment" to keep the Israeli public on edge, and that he had chosen the Shi'ite holy day of Arbaeen to launch the group's largest strike. Hezbollah planned a "careful" strategy of attack, Nasrallah said, choosing a military target "implicated" in the Shukr assassination and away from Tel Aviv – and that a decision was made to avoid attacking "civilians or infrastructure."

But were these Nasrallah's decisions or Iran's? Who really calls the shots in Hezbollah? And did Israel's assassination of Hezbollah commanders like Shukr ultimately damage the militia's capabilities enough to be worth the consequences?

Who directs Hezbollah's military strategy?

Hezbollah, which translates to "Party of God," is both a Lebanese political party and a military force. Since 1992, the face of the organization has been Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

The group's paramilitary wing, the Jihad Council, created in 1995, is formally responsible for military and security decisions. It is technically subordinate to Hezbollah's Shura Council, which doesn't matter much, since Nasrallah heads and supervises both bodies. According to experts, although Nasrallah listens and consults with his fellow Jihad Council members, he has the final word on where and when to attack Israel.

Nasrallah is the "ultimate decision maker" said Danny Citrinowicz, a former commander in IDF Military Intelligence and a research fellow in the Iran Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The Jihad Council includes "very experienced people that help Nasrallah in discussions – people with whom he goes back a long way. He trusts them and it is likely he takes what they have to say into consideration." But ultimately, he said, it is Nasrallah who decides.

Who is Nasrallah, how did he start out and how did he rise to the top?

Nasrallah dedicated his life to Shi'ite Islam and military activity from a young age, first as a commander in the Amal paramilitary and then, after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, as an early member of Hezbollah, which was inspired by Iran's Islamic Revolution and supported by its regime, and whose manifesto calls for the destruction of Israel.

He fought for Hezbollah in Lebanon's civil war and became the leader of the group in 1992, when its previous leader and co-founder, Abbas al-Musawi, was assassinated by Israel.

In retrospect, that assassination proved a massive misstep, as Hezbollah became bolder as well as more extreme and effective under Nasrallah, who gained a reputation as a clever, persuasive and well-spoken leader.

Hezbollah's military resistance to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, leading to Israel's withdrawal in 2000 and in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, increased Nasrallah's popularity at home and across the Arab world. Clashes between Hezbollah and Lebanon's ruling party turned violent in 2008, leading to a cease-fire mediated by Qatar that garnered even more power for the militia as Lebanon's political and economic stability eroded.

Hezbollah's power over Lebanon's core institutions has allowed the group, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and most European powers, to build a substantial arsenal of 150,000 missiles pointed at Israel and a militia with an estimated 50,000 soldiers.

Does Hezbollah answer to its patron Iran?

Nearly every meeting of the Jihad Council includes a representative from Iran, and there is constant communication and consultation between Nasrallah and the rest of the Hezbollah leadership and the Iranians. But the Iranians are not giving direct marching orders to Hezbollah, most observers believe.

"It is clear that Hezbollah listens to the Iranians," said Prof. Eyal Zisser, a Middle East expert who currently serves as Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University. "They give [Nasrallah] the missiles and give him money. But ever since the assassination of Qassem Soleimani," the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, "in January 2020, all of the Iranian officials are young and inexperienced relative to Nasrallah.

"Therefore, everything that happens in Lebanon comes down to Nasrallah – unless a definitive order comes down from [Iran's supreme leader Ali] Khamenei himself."

Soleimani, who was killed in a U.S strike in Iraq, was one of the most prominent and influential military figures in Iran and was considered one of the people closest to Iran's leader, Khamenei. In the current dynamic, Iran could not and would not force Hezbollah into seeking retaliation for the Shukr assassination – nor prevent it from pursuing such revenge, concurs Citrinowicz.

"Hezbollah didn't need their approval, but they definitely needed to be in contact with Iran and coordinate with them," said Citrinowicz, noting that the fact that Iran took no retaliatory action of its own against Israel in coordination with its proxy was a sign that the Iranians are "not interested in a regional war."

Moreover, he adds that the limited nature of the Hezbollah retaliation can be seen as a sign that Iran wanted to avoid a large-scale military offensive on the group so as to "preserve the organization as a deterrent force" against Israel, in keeping with Tehran's interest.

How much support does Iran give Hezbollah?

Hezbollah relies completely on Iran for financial and military support – its arms are smuggled from Iran through Syria. More recently a sea route has flourished as well, and Iran has also funded and supervised arms manufacturing in Lebanon. Since 2018, financial support from Iran to Hezbollah has commonly been estimated at $700 million annually – the figure regularly cited by U.S. officials.

According to a recent article in Politico, Western officials say the conduit for Iranian money is a Hezbollah-controlled financial firm known as al-Qard al-Hasan Association, or AQAH, which is essentially a bank without a license and designated as a non-profit to avoid taxes, which pays Hezbollah soldiers and other officials and enjoys billions in deposits.

Like the rest of the network of Iranian proxies, Hezbollah is managed in Iran by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Do the assassinations of figures like Shukr have any kind of significant deterrent effect on Hezbollah?

Zisser doesn't believe that such actions, while headline-grabbing, have any kind of immediate effect on the battlefield, neither causing real damage to Hezbollah capabilities nor deterring future action.

"It's like a never-ending fist fight," he said. "We eliminated Shukr and scored some points. Maybe their commanders are a bit more stressed and cautious. But overall, the tactical assassinations of field commanders don't make a big difference."

They do, however, send a message to Nasrallah that "we could reach you too."

What should we draw from the round of hostilities that has just played out?

The delayed and limited nature of Hezbollah's response points to the conclusion that neither the group nor its Iranian overlords are interested in a wider conflict right now.

"Given the threat, this is the best outcome and we are in the best situation Israel could hope for," said Citrinowicz. Hezbollah completed its declared revenge without massive bloodshed on the Israeli side after the IDF managed to "foil the crown jewel of their operation" by preventing the attack on a military base near Tel Aviv.

At the same time, Nasrallah did his best in his speech summarizing the operation on August 25 to paint a picture of victory and claim success while declaring this chapter of the conflict over, handing the baton to Iran's other proxies.

"Each party in the axis of resistance has the right to determine when and how to respond. After Hezbollah's response against Israel, Iran will also respond, and the Houthis," Nasrallah said.

Overall, "this was a contained escalation that was kept under careful control," said Zisser, adding tongue in cheek: "Both sides are saying they won and are parting as 'friends' – until next time."