Pinpoint Israeli Intelligence Enabled Strike on Nasrallah in Lebanon

Israel killed the Hezbollah leader, capping a series of stunning operations.

By Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

“We worry about Iran, train against Hezbollah, and fight Palestinians,” a former Israeli security official told me when I visited Israel’s northern border last year. The training has paid off. Even as the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, caught Israel’s vaunted intelligence services and military flat-footed, Israel has had a series of impressive, indeed stunning, intelligence successes against a far more formidable adversary, Hezbollah in Lebanon, culminating with the apparent assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

The Israeli military said on Saturday that Nasrallah and at least one other senior Hezbollah figure died in a massive air strike on Beirut, describing the target as the group’s underground headquarters. Lebanon said six people were killed in the attack, with the casualty number expected to rise, but Hezbollah has not confirmed Nasrallah’s death.

If true, the news would mark a devastating blow to the group. Nasrallah has led Hezbollah for 32 years, fashioning the group into a significant fighting force that waged war against Israel, received weapons and other support from Iran, and fought for years in Syria to prop up President Hafez al-Assad. But it would also almost certainly draw retaliations and escalate tensions in the region.

Nasrallah’s killing would represent the latest in a string of assassinations and intelligence operations that began on July 30, when Israel killed Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah official and founder of the organization. This was followed in recent weeks by the killing of other top figures, including Ibrahim Aqil (who was also wanted by the United States for his role in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon), Ibrahim Qubaisi, commando leader Ahmed Wahbi, and other senior Hezbollah leaders.

These assassinations occurred after Israeli intelligence sabotaged Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies, detonating thousands, wounding hundreds of Hezbollah military members, and killing dozens of people, including some women and children. Israel’s massive bombing campaign has also led to the deaths of more Hezbollah fighters and the destruction of at least part of the group’s arsenal.

Hezbollah, assisted by Iran, has strong counterintelligence, and these operations show the skill of Israel’s intelligence services. Israel’s services have performed better against Hezbollah than they have against Hamas because they recognized it as a serious threat in advance of the conflict and prepared accordingly. This respect was learned the hard way. In 2006, Israel conducted a 34-day war with Hezbollah that was widely deemed a draw—and thus a loss for Israelis accustomed to repeated and low-cost victories against Arab forces. Hezbollah fighters fought hard in 2006, and they repeatedly surprised Israel, including with a vast tunnel network that reached Israel’s border. (As big as Hamas’s tunnel network is, Hezbollah’s is far bigger.) Chastened, Israel’s military and intelligence services have worked hard to rectify their 2006 mistakes.

In contrast, Israeli officials believed before Oct. 7 that Hamas had neither the intention nor the capacity to launch a major attack on Israel. Thus, even though Israeli intelligence gathered detailed and credible information that Hamas was planning an attack, it was dismissed as aspirational planning rather than a deadly reality—even when additional intelligence came in that the plans were being implemented. Israel would not have arrogantly dismissed a captured Hezbollah plan in that way.

Israel’s focus on Iran also led to a greater focus on Hezbollah. Iran supports anti-Israel forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as well as in the West Bank and Gaza and, even more worrisome, has an advanced nuclear program. Preparing for a confrontation with Iran was a top priority for Israel, and officials believed that it could easily draw in Iran’s ally Hezbollah, which would use its vast rocket and missile arsenal and formidable fighting force to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. Preparing for Iran thus meant preparing for Hezbollah.

The recent attacks have improved the reputation of Israeli intelligence in Israel after it was damaged in the Oct. 7 surprise attack. This is important for the Israeli government, helping the population to believe that their government is, once again, able to protect them.

The biggest intelligence question for Israel today is strategic, not tactical: What will Hezbollah do in response to the devastating Israeli operations? This is hard to predict, as Hezbollah leaders themselves may not know for sure. The group’s credibility is damaged, and this may reduce support for and admiration of the group in Lebanon and outside it. In addition, its ability to fight is diminished, both due to the leadership and personnel losses and because its own communications appear so penetrated that the group may not be able to coordinate its activities. All this makes it harder for Hezbollah to strike back, even if it wants to do so and ignite an even bigger war. At the same time, embarrassed groups may lash out to restore their damaged reputations, and the group may feel that Israel will continue striking hard if it does not respond. Hezbollah may feel it is in a use-or-lose situation with its rockets and missiles. This arsenal remains large, and it may be able to inflict serious damage on Israel.

Most importantly, good policy is hard without good intelligence, but great intelligence doesn’t substitute for good policy. A month ago, Israel and Hezbollah were engaged in a limited war, and Israeli leaders may have felt that they had no hope of returning around 60,000 Israelis displaced by Hezbollah attacks if they did not step up the pressure. An all-out war, however, could backfire on Israel. Iran might join the fray, and this in turn might pull in the United States. Israel’s military and intelligence services are formidable, but war is a chancy thing. An all-out conflict could, as in 2006, be inconclusive militarily, raise Hezbollah’s stature in the region, and lead to far more death and destruction in both countries.